this alone is sufficient to justify its decisions, since in political systems characterized by constitutional and judicial supremacy, otherwise desirable political outcomes may be deemed illegitimate according to the polity's fundamental values as expressed in constitutions. In short, good policy is not the same as constitutional policy.
However, there are also electoral arguments, both normative and empirical, which suggest that majority-minority districts are not necessarily the best means of securing the adequate representation of minority group interests.
THE POLITICAL AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT OF MAJORITY-MINORITY REDISTRICTING
Two major events inspired the creation of majority-minority districts in the s. The first was the amendment in  of the Voting Rights Act () of . The original  had been very successful in increasing the number of African-American voters in the South.' Some states, however, had sought to minimize its impact by engaging in '' vote dilution '' practices : typically, this involved electing legislators on an '' at-large '' or multi-member district basis, wherein a significant black minority vote was swamped by a majority white vote. While blacks could vote freely, therefore, they had no hope of electing a black representative. Section  of the  Amendments to the  declared that such vote dilution amounted to a violation of the right to vote when : it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered ; Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
The  Amendments were clearly an exercise in political realism, intended to overcome the fact that free access to the polls was no guarantee that racial minorities could exercise a meaningful vote in the context of vote dilution practices. Yet, as the last sentence of the quoted passage makes clear, Congress was equally concerned to emphasise that the amended act did not require legislative quotas or proportionate representation. This tension between the desire for electoral equality for individual voters, regardless of race, and the disapproval of group entitlements to representation, lies at the root of the controversy over majority-minority districts today.
Four years later, in Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court echoed both the realism and the reservations of Congress when it developed a threeprong test for detecting vote dilution in multi-member districts. First, the disadvantaged minority group must be sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. Second, the minority group must be politically cohesive. And third, the white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc so as usually to defeat the minority group's preferred candidate. Only when all three of these conditions were present could states be required to reform their districting practices. ( Gingles made clear that the mere presence in sufficient numbers of minority voters in a state did not entitle them to a majority-minority district. Geographical compactness of the minority population was critical. But Gingles was sufficiently stringent to ensure that states could not neutralise '' natural '' minority districts through the use of a multimember system.
The second major event to inspire the creation of majority-minority districts in the s was the  Census and the redistribution of congressional seats that automatically follows the decennial population count. As a result, many states were required to devise redistricting plans to accommodate either the gain or loss of seats. On this occasion, however, the  Amendments to the  and their application in Gingles were important factors to be taken into account. Most decided to try to avoid the threat of Gingles litigation by abandoning multi-member districts.
Nevertheless, for Southern states in particular, this did not free them of all districting problems. Ever since , the  had required all states with a significant history of race discrimination in voting rights to submit any changes in electoral practice to the US Justice Department for '' preclearance,'' that is, approval.) Section  of the Act insisted that any change of practice avoid '' retrogression '' in the power of minority group voters ; and now the amended Section  appeared to invite augmentation of that
) Alternatively, states could seek approval of changes from the federal District Court for the District of Columbia.
power. At least, that is the way the Justice Department in both the Bush and the Clinton administrations read the situation, as it pushed hard for the creation of majority-minority districts. When states began to re-draw their single-member district boundaries in the wake of the  Census, therefore, they came under unusually intense political pressure. For not only did they have to take account of the familiar demands for incumbency protection and equitable treatment for both major political parties, they now had to reckon with a Justice Department relentlessly pursuing a maximization policy of creating as many majority-minority districts as was numerically possible. A group of white voters challenged the constitutionality of the Twelfth as a racial gerrymander, forbidden by the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When the claim reached the Supreme Court, however, the Justices did not give a definitive ruling. Nevertheless, a - majority of the Court, speaking through Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, held that districts whose bizarre shape could only be explained by racial factors must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. This is the Court's highest level of review and is reserved for the most '' suspect '' of legislative classifications -usually those which raise the spectre of invidious discrimination against ethnic and racial minorities. By applying strict scrutiny to legislation aiming to benefit minority groups, the Shaw Court seemed to suggest the equivalence of invidious and positive discrimination.
THE SUPREME COURT AND MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS
This impression was strengthened by Justice O'Connor's comments comparing the North Carolina plan with '' the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past '' and '' political apartheid.''"" Yet, despite being able to invoke such negative racist practices, Justice O'Connor struggled to articulate precisely what judicially cognizable harms were perpetrated by bizarrely shaped majority-minority districts. For, as the dissenting Justices pointed out, and Justice O'Connor did not deny, the North Carolina plan did not dilute or otherwise abridge the votes of the white appellants or anyone else in the state. Yet, without such substantive injury, the Court's voting rights precedents recognized no claim that required remedy."# With no substantial vote dilution claim made or recognized, the Court majority relied upon more generalized harms. One such harm was representational according to Justice O'Connor :
When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole."$ More important, however, was the message that racial gerrymandering transmitted :
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the colour of their skin. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanise us into competing racial factions ; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no
longer matters -a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the nation continues to aspire. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny."%
The Harvard Law Review's analysis of the Shaw decision regarded the majority opinion as rooted in a visceral objection to the odd shape of the district, rather than a logical objection to the substance of the issues it raised."& It also believed that it was predicated on a rigid application of the concept of the '' colour-blind Constitution ''."' A more careful analysis, however, suggests that the Shaw Court was neither as intellectually bankrupt nor as simplistic as the Harvard Law Review's explanation suggests.
Pildes and Niemi argue that the Shaw majority gave recognition to expressive, as opposed to material, constitutional harms :
An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from more tangible or material consequences the action brings about. On this view, the meaning of a governmental action is just as important as what that action does. Public policies can violate the Constitution not only because they can bring about concrete costs, but because the very meaning they convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values."( In other words, Shaw v. Reno raised important constitutional issues because the United States Constitution, (as indeed all constitutions), promulgates not merely the powers of institutions and the rights of individuals, but also the core values upon which the American polity takes its stand. And Shaw clearly implicates the core value of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments that, in law, race and colour, are irrelevant to political behaviour. This does not, of course, mean that race in social reality is irrelevant, as Justice O'Connor herself makes clear.") But it does establish race neutrality as a guiding principle of governmental action, any departure from which should be rare and be required to overcome a presumption of unconstitutionality.
This leads directly to a consideration of the so-called '' colour-blind
, , . The Review's anonymous author is rather puzzling in his or her insistence upon the determinative importance of the colour-blind principle, given that the article also registers Justice O'Connor's specific refutation that colour-blindness prohibits all forms of race-conscious districting, p. , fn. . "( R. Pildes and R. Niemi, '' Expressive Harms, ' Bizarre Districts,' and Voting Rights :
principle '' in contemporary American jurisprudence and politics. Much has been written both for and against a colour-blind constitution and it represents one of the most powerful images in American constitutionalism."* Whereas, however, the colour-blind principle was the rallying cry for the liberal-left and the civil rights movement for much of the twentieth century, it has now become a core belief of American conservatism. This is due in part to the advent of affirmative action in the s. Justified in the eyes of the liberal-left in order to compensate for past wrongs and to guarantee some measure of equal social outcomes, affirmative action struck the right as nothing less than '' reverse discrimination '' and the wholesale abandonment of the ideal of constitutional colour-blindness.
The point here is not to debate the merits of colour-blindness, but merely to establish that it does not possess a reactionary or otherwise ignoble origin. Far from it. The phrase belongs to none other than the first Justice Harlan, who was the lone dissenter on the Supreme Court when it upheld the principle of racial segregation in the infamous case of Plessy v. Ferguson ().#! While acknowledging the social reality of the superior position of the white race, Harlan argued that all races were equal in law :
in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colour-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.#"
The colour-blind principle underpinned the reversal of Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education (), the Civil Rights Act of  and the Voting Rights Act of  -all rightly considered to be liberal triumphs in American history.## All were based on the assumption that racial classifications were usually irrational and intended to stigmatize racial minorities with a badge of inferiority. And all were based on the ideal that the United States is a society where government cannot treat different citizens differently because of their race and where all should strive to eliminate the relevance of race. This is not to say that the colour-blind principle is necessarily absolute in its refusal to countenance race. Indeed, both the majority and minority opinions in Shaw permit some forms of race-consciousness in law.#$ The point, then, is simply that racial classifications are highly disfavoured in both the text and spirit of the Constitution. It is perfectly reasonable, therefore, that the Supreme Court should treat all racial classifications, and perhaps especially those that pertain to voting rights, as '' suspect '' and subject them to strict scrutiny.
Having stressed that '' reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter,''#% the Shaw Court left uncertain the issue of whether only bizarrely shaped majority-minority districts were constitutionally suspect. Two years later, however, the Court articulated a much clearer and substantial analysis of race-conscious redistricting.
Miller v. Johnson () Following the  Census, Georgia became entitled to an eleventh congressional seat. With a black population of some  per cent, the state decided to increase the number of its majority-minority districts from one to two. These were the Fifth and the Eleventh Districts. The Justice Department, however, refused pre-clearance for the plan, on the grounds that certain minority populations were not '' recognized '' by being placed within a majority-minority district.#& The Georgia General Assembly submitted a second plan, which increased the black population of the Fifth, Eleventh and Second districts, but there remained only two majority-minority districts. This plan was also turned down by the Justice Department, pointing out the possibility of creating three such districts. This was duly achieved in Georgia's third plan, but only by creating an unusually elongated Eleventh district, stretching  miles from Atlanta to Savannah on the coast.
The plan was accepted by the Justice Department and, in the  elections, all three seats were won by black Democrats. Subsequently, however, five white voters from the Eleventh district challenged its boundaries as a racial gerrymander under Shaw's application of the Equal Protection clause.
The state relied for its defence on the fact that the plaintiffs had not established that the Eleventh district's boundaries were so bizarre that they were inexplicable except on the basis of race. The Supreme Court,
however, speaking through Justice Kennedy, recast the Shaw opinion by downplaying the emphasis on bizarreness of shape. Bizarre shape is not a necessary element of a Shaw claim, said Justice Kennedy, but merely one indication that the state has pursued racial considerations over and above all others.#' Thus henceforth, to prove a racial gerrymander :
a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations. Where these or other race-neutral considerations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not subordinated to race, a state can defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.#( Justice Kennedy proceeded to rely more upon the legislative history of the redistricting plan than the shape of the Eleventh. He concurred with the lower court's finding that the Justice Department was clearly operating a maximization plan with regard to majority-minority districts and that it would only accept Georgia's '' abject surrender '' to its agenda.#) For its part, the Georgia Assembly spent months trying to comply with the Justice Department's demands and had thus provided plenty of evidence of its own culpability. For example, the Attorney General of Georgia had written to the Justice Department complaining that its maximization policy required the state to '' violate all reasonable standards of compactness and contiguity.''#* The conclusion that race had been the overriding factor in the drawing of the Eleventh's boundaries triggered strict scrutiny and thus the question of whether the redistricting plan was justified by being '' narrowly tailored '' to serve a '' compelling '' state interest. Justice Kennedy demonstrated that compliance with neither Section  nor Section  of the  required acceptance of the Justice Department's maximization plan. Section  required that changes in electoral practices avoid retrogression in the position of minorities, but Georgia had already fulfilled that requirement in its initial plan to increase the number of majority-minority seats from one out of ten ( %) to two out of eleven (n %).$! Thus, the Justice Department's version of what was required of states by Section  was erroneous and compliance with it was not a compelling interest.$" Furthermore, because the Eleventh did not contain a compact minority population, as required under Gingles' application of Section , there was compelling interest in rectifying vote dilution.
Beyond that, however, Kennedy was at pains to point out that the original philosophy behind the Voting Rights Act and the Court's decision in Miller were the same -eliminating race discrimination :
Only if our political system and our society cleanse themselves of that discrimination will all members of the polity share an equal opportunity to gain public office regardless of race. As a Nation we share both the obligation and the aspiration of working toward this end. The end is neither assured nor wellserved, however, by carving electorates into racial blocs.$# Justice Kennedy's recasting of Shaw in Miller removed the amorphous issue of bizarre shape from the centre of the Court's analysis, but only to plunge the Justices deeper into the intricacies of the redistricting process. For now the Court was required to evaluate the relative weight that had been given to race and various traditional redistricting principles.
As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's dissent observed, however, '' legislative redistricting is highly political business.''$$ Thus, District lines are drawn to accommodate a myriad of factors -geographical, economic, historical, and political -and state legislatures, as arenas of compromise and electoral accountability, are best positioned to mediate competing claims ; courts, with a mandate to adjudicate, are ill-equipped for the task.$% Moreover, Ginsburg's review of the history of Georgia's plan demonstrated that factors other than race were significant.$& More fundamentally, however, Justice Ginsburg disputed the Court's understanding of what constituted communities of interest for redistricting purposes. Whereas the Court emphasized a geographical concept of community, Ginsburg argued that race and ethnicity could define community and, indeed, had always done so in the United States : '' To accommodate the reality of ethnic bonds, legislatures have long drawn voting districts along ethnic lines. Our Nation's cities are full of districts identified by their ethnic character -Chinese, Irish, Italian, Jewish, Polish, Russian, for example. ''$'
The weakness in Justice Ginsburg's argument, however, is that she pointed to a history of districting where ethnic identity and geographical compactness coincided. What the Court objected to was that when there was no longer any such overlap, the state had chosen to give pre-eminence to the racial factor above all others.
Shaw had been an '' easy '' case because of its bizarre shape. Miller was more difficult, because bizarre shape was not such a prominent factor and
race was not the sole criterion that had determined the lines of the Eleventh. Still, the five Justice majority on the Court stuck to its belief that, despite complexities that drew the Court deeply into the redistricting process, sound judgement could still distinguish between districts where race had been the predominant factor and those where race-consciousness had not led to the elimination of all other traditional districting criteria. That confidence was next tested the following year.
Bush v. Vera, Shaw v. Hunt ()
Shaw v. Hunt was the sequel to Shaw v. Reno. And given the Court's anxieties about the bizarre shape of North Carolina's Twelfth district in Shaw , it came as no surprise that it was duly condemned as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in Shaw II. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice William Rehnquist, rejected the state's argument that the district was justified by compelling interests in remedying past discrimination or in complying with Sections  and  of the . Applying the Miller standard of race as the predominant factor, he also dismissed the argument that the district was legitimate simply because the state had given some consideration to race-neutral factors : '' race was the legislature's predominant consideration. Race was the criterion that in the State's view, could not be compromised ; respecting communities of interest and protecting Democratic incumbents came into play only after the race-based decision had been made. ''$( If Shaw II was something of a foregone conclusion, however, Bush v. Vera presented a more challenging set of circumstances. As Justice O'Connor conceded, it was a '' mixed motive '' case because '' the record does not reflect a history of purely race-based districting revisions.''$)
The factual background to Vera is a familiar one. Texas had gained three seats as a result of the  Census and its redistricting plan contained new majority-minority seats in Districts , , and .$* These districts were successfully challenged in the federal District Court as racial gerrymanders.
Justice O'Connor brought both Shaw I '' electoral architecture '' and Miller's emphasis on legislative history to bear in deciding whether race
$) Vera, p. . $* Most of the State's population increase since  had occurred in urban minority areas.
Thus District  was an African-American majority district in Dallas County ; District  was an Hispanic majority district in and around Houston ; and District , adjacent to District , was a reconfigured seat with an African-American majority, Vera, pp. -.
had indeed been the predominant factor motivating the Texas redistricting plan. She noted, for example, that the major study of district shape in the country ranked the previous  Texas plan as about average in the nation for compactness and regularity, whereas the  plan was among the worst.%! More importantly, the testimony of state officials established '' that the decision to create the districts now challenged as majority-minority districts was made at the outset of the process and never seriously challenged. ''%"
Justice O'Connor was also clearly impressed by the  computer program which had been used to draw the districts and which had employed block-by-block racial housing data in the process.%# Justice O'Connor also furthered her reputation for making very fine distinctions in constitutional adjudication. Thus she emphasized that there was nothing wrong with creating majority-minority districts per se, where these were compatible with traditional districting principles. Nor, on the other hand, was mere neglect of traditional districting criteria alone sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. The problem occurred only when a deadly combination of factors suggested that race had predominated in such a way that traditional districting criteria had been subordinated to it.%$ There was little doubt, according to O'Connor, that race had indeed predominated in Districts  and . Shaw I factors alone were enough to establish a strong case for that.%% District , however, was significantly different. The core of the District was compact, if irregularly shaped ; and while the rest of the District was rather bizarrely shaped, there was real evidence that this had been caused by incumbency protection factors. Thus, early in the redistricting process, Democrat Representative Dawn Johnson, for whom the safe District  was intended, had submitted a plan for a  per cent African-American district. This plan violated no county or voter tabulation district lines. The Johnson plan was abandoned, however, when several incumbents objected, especially to the loss of African-American voters that the plan entailed.%& Under the Court's precedents, gerrymandering to avoid conflicts between incumbents is constitutionally permitted. And if the pursuit of Democratic voters in the redistricting process happens to coincide with racial lines, that too is permitted. What is not permitted, according to the Having made the case for the application of strict scrutiny, all three districts were found by the Court to fail that test. No compelling interest could be found in Section  of the Voting Rights Act, since that had been interpreted by the Court in Gingles to require a compact minority population and none of the three Texas districts possessed one of sufficient magnitude.
In regard to the re-configured District , the state claimed a compelling interest in avoiding a violation of Section 's nonretrogression principle. But, said the Court, creating a majority-minority District  amounted to augmentation rather than non-retrogression.%*
THE ELECTORAL VALUE OF MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS
Aside from constitutional issues, there remains the question of whether majority-minority districts actually achieve the goals their proponents desire. Although it may take several election cycles before the answers become clear, it is arguable that minority representation will not suffer, and may even be enhanced, by the Supreme Court's stricter regime on majority-minority districts. The simplest measure of minority representation in the House of Representatives is the number of minority legislators. Here there is no
doubt that the maximization policy operative since  led to impressive gains. Thus the  elections saw an increase of  (from  to ) in the number of African-American members of the House, all of them elected in newly created majority-minority districts.&! All  held their seats in the  elections. There were also in   additional Hispanic members, up from  to .
There is, however, another side to the  and  elections : they resulted in significant gains for white Republican candidates, particularly in Southern states where redistricting had involved the creation of majority-minority seats. Thus in Georgia, the state involved in Miller v. Johnson, white Republicans held  seat out of  in ,  out of  in  and  out of  in .&" These gains contributed significantly to the  recapture of the House by the Republican Party for the first time since .
Of course, far more than redistricting was responsible for this. Indeed, despite the fact that most observers and politicians believe that the net effect of creating majority-minority districts has been to help the Republican Party in some way, even this has been disputed.&# Yet the reaction of party leaders to the Supreme Court's decisions is telling. When the Georgia state legislature failed to agree a new redistricting plan in the wake of Miller, a federal court drew up a plan containing only one majority-minority seat instead of three. If you have four districts in a state like Alabama, for example, with a sufficiently large black population to neutralise Republicans on some issues, and if you create one black district by gathering up all the blacks in such a fashion that they could elect a black person to Congress, and in the process you lose the leverage you had in the other three districts, then that's foolish to me. Every time the one person votes for the things that I'm for, and that the black community is for, the other three from the state will probably vote against them.&& Whether in favour of majority-minority or minority-influence districts, however, the fundamental assumption has always been that white voters will not vote for minority candidates in sufficient numbers to elect African-American or Hispanic members of Congress from majority-white districts. This, indeed, as we saw above, was the basic premise of the  Amendments to the  and their application by the Supreme Court in Gingles.
Even this justification for majority-minority districts may now require some reconsideration. For after their initial disappointment with the Supreme Court's rulings, both those Representatives most directly affected and the Congressional Black Caucus see grounds for greater optimism.
The key to this brighter outlook has been the strong showing of minority House incumbents in the  congressional elections and increasing the turn-out of black voters.&* It was still thought, however, that McKinney was very vulnerable to her white Republican challenger in November. Yet, in the event, she defeated him  to  per cent.'! It would be wrong to read too much into the results of the  elections. Nevertheless, they do demonstrate that majority-minority districts are not a precondition of minority membership of the House of Representatives. And this breach in the argument that a majority white constituency will not elect a minority candidate should encourage the liberal-left to pursue the political route to winning its electoral goals, rather than rely upon the intervention of the Supreme Court.
Even if the  elections turn out to be a false dawn, however, the Supreme Court should not embrace a wholeheartedly results-oriented jurisprudence. And it is to its credit that it did not do so in these redistricting cases. Rather, it maintained the critical division between fundamental law and politics by interpreting the Constitution according to accepted judicial canons and doing so in an intelligent and reasoned fashion. That the electoral consequences of the Court's decisions may be unfortunate is the price to be paid for judicial review of constitutional values.
